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MARITAL SETTLEMENTS AND FEDERAL TAXATION
JOSEPH HAWLEY MURPHY t
Legal problems emanating from the marital relationship have
always been enigmatic and perplexing even, perhaps, as the
relationship itself. Matters of domicile, jurisdiction and conflicts
of laws, to mention a few, have harassed the general practitioner
since the early days of our jurisprudence. Many of these diffi-
culties have been projected into the tax field, and to them have
been added the incongruities indigenous to that area of law, a
result no doubt anticipated by experts in both branches. Prob-
lems have multiplied so that a general practitioner, with one
eye on antagonistic or anxious clients haggling over the pro-
visions of a marital settlement or antenuptial agreement, and
the other on the Internal Revenue Code, might well echo the
words of Cicero "Quo usque tandem abutere ... patentid nostra?
Quam diu etiam furor iste tuus nos eludet?"
It is doubtful that this article will do much to allay the con-
fusion presently existing. Tax law is a field in which even
experts are well advised to express doubts. Attempt will be
made to discuss some of the consequences of antenuptial agree-
ments and marital settlements from the standpoint of Federal
Estate, Gift and Income Taxes. Perhaps the reader may learn
some pitfalls to be encountered, albeit not avoided. It is hoped
that he may have some idea of what a sympathetic Congress
might do by way of smoothing the path for the legal advisor.
Essentially, the problem is the same in the field of estate,
gift and income taxation. It is the extent to which marriage
and marital rights constitute consideration for transfers made
tAssistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law.
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pursuant to matrimonial settlements, either by the potential or
the disgusted husband or, for that matter, by his female count-
erpart, equally anxious or fed up. Like the astute legal examiner,
the tax collector can continue to use the same questions but
require a different answer.
Citation of authority is unnecessary for the proposition that
the surrender of dower or curtesy rights or their statutory
equivalents, such as the right to elect against the will of one's
spouse, the right of a wife to support from her husband and
similar attributes of the matrimonial bond, constitutes a con-
sideration valid to support most common law transactions.
However, when recourse is had to the problems of the tax
collector, it is quite apparent that something more than natural
love and affection or even the marital rights attendant upon
such love and affection translated into a more enduring bond
-the so-called "ties that bind"-is necessary if schemes of
tax avoidance are not to flourish.
In the present provisions of the Internal Revenue Code,
transfers made or obligations incurred "for an adequate and.
full consideration in money or money's worth" are excluded
from the gross estate as transfers in contemplation of death,'
as transfers taking effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
death,2 as revocable transfers,3 as jointly owned interests,4 as
powers of appointment,5 and as insurance. The question of
sufficiency of consideration on partially taxable transfers under
these sections is also dealt with in haec verbe7 and the important
matter of estate tax deductions for claims hinges upon this
phrase.$ The only attempt at defining a "gift" in the gift tax
law, and this by negative implication, is couched in the same
language. 9 Important income tax consequences rest upon
whether property was given0 or transferred for consideration."
Naturally, it is vital from the point of view of the Treasury
1. INT. REV. CODE, § 811 (c) (1)-(A).
2. INT. REV. CODE, § 811 (c) (1) (B).
3. INT. REv. CODE, § 811 (d).
4. INT. REV. CODE, § 811 (e
5. INT. REV. CODE, § 811 ()).
6. INT. REV. CODE, § 811 (g (3).
'7. INT. REV. CODE, § 811 (i).
8. INT. REV. CODE, § 812 (b).
9. INT. REV. CODE, § 1002.
10. INT. Rzv. CODE, § 113 (a).
11. INT. REV. CODE, § 113 (a) (2).
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Department and the Congress, with, of course, judicial aid,
to insure that tax avoidance in these important particulars is
minimized. It is in the attempt to achieve this result that
many anomalies in these major fields of taxation have developed.
THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
Decisions antedating the present Federal Estate Tax had
jousted with the problem of consideration. For example, one
law taxed conveyances "without valuable and adequate con-
sideration," and it was held that a deed of gift as an advancement
against the ultimate share of the donee in his father's estate
did not meet the statutory test.12 The court stated:
The "valuable and adequate consideration" referred to ...
must be held to mean either money paid or some present
legal interest or estate parted with or charged, or services
rendered to the value of the property received."3
A Massachustts succession tax requiring "full consideration in
money or money's worth" was said to cover "the value in
money or the equivalent in money of the property trans-
ferred."1' 4 These decisions seem particularly significant because
of the similarity of the statutory language involved to present
day law and the seeming judicial tendency toward tangibility
and concreteness in meeting the tests imposed.
The initial Federal Estate Tax, as far as its present con-
tinuous history is concerned, dealt with the question of consid-
eration only with respect to transfers and not deductions. It
included transfers in contemplation of death or taking effect
in possession or enjoyment at or after death, "except a bona
fide sale for a fair consideration in money or money's worth.P"'
The question arose as to whether dower, curtesy and like inter-
ests were included as part of a decedent's estate within this defi-
nition, and some doubt was occasioned by reason of state court
holdings that a surviving spouse takes property upon the basis
of rights arising from the matrimonial relationship and not
by reason of testate or intestate succession. 6 Under such a
rationale it could be argued, inter alia, that the transfer of
12. United States v. Banks, 17 Fed. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1883).
13. Id. at 323.
14. State Street Trust Co. v. Stevens, 209 Mass. 373, 95 N.E. 851 (1911).
15. Revenue Act of 1916, § 202 (b), 39 STAT. 777 (1916).
16. E.g., Matter of Starbuck, 137 App. Div. 866, 122 N.Y. Supp. 584(2d Dep't 1910), aff'd mem., 201 N.Y. 513, 94 N.E. 1092 (1911).
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property to a spouse upon death of the mate was in satisfaction
of these marital rights.
The argument was tenuous at best, but the Congress sought
to cover it by an amendment to the law. While it was felt
that these marital rights were mere expectations and properly
a part of the gross estate," dower, curtesy and other marital
rights in the decedent's property were specifically included in
the gross estate by a 1918 amendment."' This change was
intended to clarify existing law. 9 While it was probably an
excess of caution in the light of later decisions,0 it serves as
an illustration of the position which dower, curtesy and other
marital rights occupied in the general concept of separability
of property interests for tax purposes.
The element of consideration as a requisite of estate tax
deductions based upon claims was not part of the first laws.
The act of 1916 permitted deduction of claims against the
estate "allowed by the laws of the jurisdiction ... under which
the estate is being administered. 2 1  This treatment was con-
tinued under the 191822 and 192123 acts. Because of the wide
latitude in this provision it was felt desirable to require that
claims against an estate, to be allowable as deductions, be
supported by the same consideration as transfers., The 1924
Act, therefore, limited deductible claims to those supported by
"a fair consideration in money or money's worth."22
Realizing that dower, curtesy and like interests were con-
sidered mere expectations passing in the same manner as other
estate property, it might seem logical to assume that they would
not be interpreted as consideration within the language used.
This, however, was not to be. A few cases arose in which the
Commissioner sought to argue that certain transfers, either
antenuptial or post-marital in nature, and in consideration of
the release of dower, curtesy and like rights, were not supported
by "a fair consideration in money or money's worth." In each
17. H. R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1918).
18. Revenue Act of 1918, § 402 (b), 40 STAT. 1077 (1918).
19. H. R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1918).
20. E.g., Mayer v. Reinecke, 130 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 684 (1942)
21. Revenue Act of 1916, § 203 (a) (1), 39 STAT. 778 (1916).
22. Revenue Act of 1918, § 403 (a) (1), 40 STAT. 1098 (1918).
23. Revenue Act of 1921. § 403 (a) (1). 42 STAT. 279 (1921).
24. H. R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, 66 (1924).
25. Revenue Act of 1924, § 303 (a) (1), 43 STAT. 305 (1924).
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instance he was defeated, the courts adhering strictly to estab-
lished concepts of common law and holding that such a transfer
was a bona fide sale for a fair consideration in money or money's
worthy.2  It is especially interesting to note these cases involved
the transfer sections of the law in which dower, curtesy and
similar interests had been treated by the Congress" and the
courts" as gossamer possibilities, having no status independent
from tangible estate property.
Further tightening of the concept of consideration was in
order. The 1926 Act changed the phrase to read "for an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth,"'"
a combination, perhaps, of the tighter aspects of the language
interpreted in United States v. Banks" and State Street Trust
Co. v. Stevens. 1 The present Code provisions 32 have uniformly
retained this definition. As the Supreme Court said:
There must have been some reason for these successive
changes. It seems evident that the purpose was to narrow
the class of deductible claims . . .3
The Board of Tax Appeals interpreted this amendment in
Empire Trust Co., et al., Executors," in which an antenuptial
agreement, which called for the surrender of dower and statutory
rights by a wife, was the basis for a claim against the estate
of a decedent who died in 1931. The Board disallowed the
deduction with an opinion which pointed out that dower was
a portion of the gross estate and its inclusion could not be
nullified by agreement. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, pointing
out that statutory history called for this result. However,
other decisions were not as clear, and doubts were raised.36
26. McCaughan v. Carver, 19 F.2d 126 (3rd Cir. 1927); Ferguson v.
Dickson, 300 Fed. 961 (3rd Cir. 1924); Stubblefield v. United States, 79 Ct.
Cl. 268, 6 F.Supp. 440 (1934); Mason et al. v. United States, 17 F.2d 317
(S.D. Fla. 1926).
27. H. R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1918).
28. E.g., Mayer v. Reinecke, 130 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 684 (1942).
29. E.g. Revenue Act of 1926, § 303 (a) (1), 44 STAT. 72 (1926).
30. 17 Fed. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1883).
31. 209 Mass. 373, 95 N.E. 851 (1911).
32. See notes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, supra.
33. Taft v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 351, 356 (1938).
34. Empire Trust Co. et al. Executor v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 866
(1937).
35. Empire Trust Co. et al. v. Commissioner, 94 F.2d 307 (4th Cir.
1938).
36. E.g., Commissioner v. Kelly's Estate, 84 F.2d 958 (7th Cir. 1936),
cert. denied, 299 U.S. 603 (1936).
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In 1932 the Congress felt that further clarification was called
for because, if the value of relinquished marital rights "in
whole or in part constitute a consideration for an otherwise
taxable transfer... or an otherwise allowable deduction from
the gross estate the effect produced amounts to a subversion of
the legislative intent." 7  Accordingly the following paragraph
now covering the estate tax was added :38
For the purposes of this subehapter, a relinquishment or
promised relinquishment of dower, curtesy, or of a statutory
estate created in lieu of dower or curtesy, or of other marital
rights in the decedent's property or estate, shall not be
considered to any extent a consideration "in money or
money's worth."39
It is notable that while this provision appears in the section
relating to deductible claims, its express terms make it appli-
cable to the whole estate tax title of which that section is a
part and it covers transfer as well.4
It was recognized that this amendment was not intended to
cover, nor did it purport to cover, claims for support by children
of a decedent, and deductions based upon such claims, which, if
in fact in satisfaction of legal obligations to support, were allow-
able.4 . It was likewise quite clear that where dower, curtesy or
similar statutory rights were surrendered, either before or after
marriage, in return for an agreement to pay money or transfer
property, the amount by which the decedent became obligated
was not a deductible claim against his estate."
Between these poles were many variants. It was not always
clear where the obligation to support children ended and dower,
curtesy or statutory rights of the spouse began. It would seem
that the Commissioner's nonacquiescence in Estate of Eben B.
37. H. R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1932); SEN. REP. No.
665, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1932).
38. INT. REv. CODE, § 812 (b).
39. Revenue Act of 1932, § 804, 47 STAT. 169 (1932).
40. Sheets v. Commissioner, 95 F.2d 727 (8th Cir. 1938).
41. William Weiser, Executor v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 1144 (1939),
aff'd sub nom. Commissioner v. Weiser, 113 F.2d 486 (10th Cir. 1940);
Helvering v. United States Trust Co., 111 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 678 (1940); Estate of Eben B. Phillips v. Commissioner,
36 B.T.A. 752 (1937), nonacq., E.T., 1938-1 Cum. BuLL. 52.
42. Meyer's Estate v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 310 U.S. 651 (1940); Adriance v. Higgins, 113 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir.
1940); Markwell's Estate v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1940);
Estate of Rosalean B. Ottmann v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 118 (1949).
Nantke v. United States, 35 F.Supp. 450 (W.D. N.Y. 1940); and cases cited
note 41, supra.
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Phillips" was probably based on his contention that the tax-
payer's proof did not properly delineate between the two or
support the former. So too, in Estate of George Tuttle Bro-
kaw,4 the Board took the position that the obligation to support
the children was sufficient to sustain a deduction for the whole
amount called for by the agreement, although the release of
dower and statutory rights was clearly involved. On appeal,
however, the Second Circuit reversed, distinguishing between
the two."5
What of support of the spouse? Most marital settlements
provide sums for the wife which would be analagous to the
alimony or maintenance provisions of a court decree. Is the com-
muted value of such payments a deductible claim? If covered
at all by Section 812 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code, since
this is not dower, curtesy or their statutory equivalents, it must
be by the catch-all phrase "other marital rights in the decedent's
property or estate."
In Estate of Silas B. Mason,46 the Board allowed a deduction
based upon payments due under a separation agreement incor-
porated in a decree. While the decision could have rested upon
another ground, namely, as an obligation founded on court
decree, the Board appeared to base its decision on the fact that
this was an obligation imposed by law, that of a husband to
support his wife, and not upon a "promise or agreement" as
described in Section 812(b). While the Commissioner regis-
tered nonacquiescence,47 he did not prosecute the appeal he
embarked upon. In Rogan v. Riggle,'8 the Ninth Circuit in-
ferred that a spouse's support rights might stand on a footing
different from dower, curtesy or statutory interests, although
it disallowed a claimed deduction on the ground that the tax-
payer had failed in proof.
However, in the Second and Seventh Circuits, the Commis-
sioner has had more success with his contention that support
43. Estate of Eben B. Phillips v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 752 (1937),
nonacq., E.T., 1938-1 CUM. BULL. 52.
44. Estate of George Tuttle Brokaw v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 783
(1939).
45. Helvering v. United States Trust Co., 111 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1940).
46. Estate of Silas B. Mason v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 813 (1941),
app. dismissed, (6th Cir.) 5-14-42.
47. E.T., 1942-1 CUM. BuLL. 26.
48. 128 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1942).
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rights are included within the phrase, "other marital rights
in the decedent's property or estate." In Meyers Estate v.
Commissioner4 it was said:
That part of the consideration which was the giving up by
the wife of her right to support is also fairly within the
phrase "other marital rights in the decedent's property or
estate" though not of the same nature as dower . . . the
right of the wife to support and maintenance from her hus-
band is what she gave up in addition to her relinquishment
of dower."
Judge Hand, who dissented, was forced to define what "other
marital rights" meant, if not support and maintenance. He
wrote, rather lamely it would seem, "It is true that I cannot
think of any, but that seems to me neither conclusive nor
important; statutory draughtsmen often provide against pos-
sibilities which have not yet arisen." 51 In Markwel's Estate v.
Commissioner" concurrence with the view of the majority in
the Meyer's case could be inferred.
Another danger to be avoided by the tax practitioner arises
from a dichotomy which has arisen when a court decree, vis a
vis a mere interspousal agreement, has imposed the financial
burden. Again the words "founded upon a promise or agree-
ment," contained in Section 812(b) come into play because
this is the type of indebtednes which must meet the "adequate
and full consideration" test. It seems quite clear that a court
decree is not a promise or agreement and hence a claim founded
on it is deductible.5 3 However, is the same rule applicable to
an agreement incorporated in a decree? Does it apply to the
situation where the decree follows an agreement, but neither
incorporates nor refers to it, leaving financial matters to rest
on the agreement? Lastly, does not such a distinction forsake
realities for formalisms?
In Edythe C. Young, 4 an agreement was incorporated in a
decree which, on the death of the husband, was settled by the
payment of a lump sum pursuant to another decree. The Board
49. 110 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 651 (1940).
50. Id. at 368-369.
51. Ibid.
52. 112 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1940).
53. Estate of Francis Browne, Grinnell v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 1286
(1941), aff'd sub nora. Commissioner v. State Street Trust Co., 128 F.2d
618 (1st Cir. 1942).
54. Edythe C. Young v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 230 (1939).
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permitted deduction of this sum from the gross estate and the
Commissioner noted his nonacquiescence.15 The same result
was reached in a district court case,56 affirmed by the Fourth
Circuit," which reiterated its position in a later case." How-
ever, the Markwel and Meyer's Estate opinions, as well as
Win. Weiser' discussed above, had also involved agreements
followed by decrees. They were distinguished on the ground
that the decree did not adopt or incorporate the agreement.
In Commissioner v. Maresi ° the agreement was incorporated
in the decree and the Second Circuit allowed a deduction from
the gross estate under Section 812 (b) adhering to the cleavage
heretofore made and remarking:
At first blush the distinction may appear to be a little
formal but on consideration it appears to be sound."
An agreement covering support for spouse and children, and
a release of dower, curtesy, or statutory rights will not con-
stitute a valid deduction for estate tax purposes except as to
children's support. If incorporated in a decree, all items are
deductible. When one realizes the ease with which such decrees
are obtained, rather than appearing to be a little formal, it
seems to be a distinction without a difference and the Commis-
sioner's nonacquiescence is understandable. However, the con-
fusion in the whole field of marital obligation deductions for
estate tax purposes, a problem which has been with the tax-
payer far too long,"' seems to call for clarifying action by the
Supreme Court or the Congress.
THE FEDERAL GIFT TAX
When the first Federal Gift Tax law was enacted in 1924
there were classified as gifts all sales or exchanges for less
than "a fair consideration in money or money's worth."6 3 In
adopting this test the Congress utilized the then current
55. E.T., 1939-1 CuM. BULL. (Part 1) 69.
56. Fleming v. Yoke, 53 F.Supp. 552 (N.D. W.Va. 1944).
57. Yoke v. Fleming, 145 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1944).
58. Commissioner v. Estate of Swink, 155 F.2d 723 (4th Cir. 1946).
59. William Weiser, Executor, v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 1144 (1939),
aff'd sub nom. Commissioner v. Weiser, 113 F.2d 486 (10th Cir. 1940).
60. 156 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1946).
61. Id. at 931.
62. See, e.g., Hines, Tax Aspects of Property Settlement Agreement, 12
So. CALIF. L. REv. 386 (1939).
63. Revenue Act of 1924, § 320, 43 STAT. 314 (1924).
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definition of consideration as it had originated in the transfer
sections of the estate tax provisions of the 1916 and later
acts 4 and as it had been picked up in the deduction section of
the 1924 Act.6 The indication that the test should be the
same seemed abundantly clear from this procedure and, of
course, the infirmities under those tests followed their trans-
position to the new gift tax law.
However, the continuity of the estate tax provisions was not
present in the case of the gift tax. The Gift Tax Law of 1924,
being the first foray into the field, was an unpopular measure
with the Congress from the outset,"6 and it was finally approved
only after a bitter floor debate in which the Democratic
Minority prevailed. 67 It was acknowledged a failure 8 and
repealed in 1926.9
In 1932 a revenue-conscious Congress,0 spurred on no doubt
by the decision of the Supreme Court in Heiner v. Donnan1
holding that the conclusive presumption in the 1926 Act as to
gifts in contemplation of death violated due process, re-enacted
a gift tax measure.12 It dealt with the question of considera-
tion in the terms of the 1926 estate tax changes3 and in the
same language presently appearing in Section 1002 of the
Code:
Where property is transferred for less than an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth, then
the amount by which the value of the property exceeded
the value of the consideration shall, for the purpose of the
tax imposed by this chapter, be deemed a gift, and shall
be included in computing the amount of gifts made during
the calendar year. 74
However, the gift tax law did not contain a counterpart of
that portion of Section 812(b) added in 1932 which specified
that "a relinquishment or promised relinquishment of dower,
curtesy, or of a statutory estate created in lieu of dower or
64. Revenue Act of 1916, § 202 (b), 39 STAT. 777 (1916); Revenue Act
of 1918, § 402 (b), 40 STAT. 1077 (1918).
65. Revenue Act of 1924, § 303 (a)(1), 43 STAT. 305 (1924).
66. SEN. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (Amend. No. 179) (1924).
67. 65 CONG. REc. 3120, 3172-73, 8095-96 (1924).
68. SEN. REP. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 339 (1925).
69. Revenue Act of 1926, § 1200 (a), 44 STAT. (Part 2) 1278 (1926).
70. H. R. REP. No. 708, 72 Cong., 1st Sess. 462 (1932).
71. 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
72. Revenue Act of 1932, § 501-532, 47 STAT. 245 (1932).
73. Revenue Act of 1926, § 303 (a) (1), 44 STAT. 72 (1926).
74. Revenue Act of 1932 § 503, 47 STAT. 247 (1932).
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curtesy, or of other marital rights in the decedent's property
or estate shall not be considered to any extent a consideration
in 'money or money's worth',"' '75 nor does the phrase concerning
claims "founded upon a promise or agreement," also contained
in Section 812(b), have an opposite number in Section 1002
since it is concerned with transfers, whatever the considera-
tion. The Regulations do contain a sentence covering this
matter, though in a somewhat different manner:
A consideration not reducible to money value, as love and
affection, promise of marriage, etc., is to be wholly dis-
regarded, and the entire value of the property transferred
constitutes the amount of the gift."
This description had been the subject of earlier regulations."
It seemed evident that the Congress was endeavoring to ap-
ply the same treatment, conceptually speaking, to considera-
tion for the gift tax as it had for the estate tax. However,
it perhaps is to be criticized for failure to particularize, as
is the Treasury for failing to do so in its regulations. The
issue was first presented in cases involving antenuptial agree-
ments under which a woman, prior to marriage, surrendered
dower and statutory rights in her prospective husband's prop-
erty in consideration for his transferring money to or set-
tling payments upon her.
In John D. Archbold,8 a transfer by the husband was held
to be a gift because the taxpayer failed to prove that she had
dower rights which approximated the value of the transfer
to her. In Bennett B. BristoP the Board held that a transfer
of such rights was good consideration and, accordingly, that
no gift tax liability was incurred by the husband by reason
of his payment. The Board reasoned that the gift and estate
tax laws were not in pari materia so that the estate tax pro-
visions specifically relating to dower, curtesy and statutory
rights could be imported into the gift tax law. The First Cir-
cuit, however, reversed this decision, holding that the two
laws should be read together on this point. 0 The theory
adopted seemed to rest on the basic purposes of the first estate
75. Revenue Act of 1932, § 804, 47 STAT. 169 (1932).
76. U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.8 and § 86.11 (1943).
77. U.S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 8 (1936).
78. John D. Archbold v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 453 (1940).
79. Bennett B. Bristol v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 263 (1940).
80. Commissioner v. Bristol, 121 F.2d 129 (1st Cir. 1941).
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tax laws and because a contrary holding "would permit an un-
taxed transfer by gift of property which would normally be
subject to the estate tax upon the husband's death."'"
However, these decisions hardly settled the matter. In
Albert D. Lasker82 a wife released her future property rights
in her husband's estate and promised to live with him dur-
ing his life in return for his promise to provide for her in
his will. After marriage she released these contractural rights
for $375,000. The Tax Court, adhering to its position in the
Bristol case, nonetheless held that a taxable gift had been
made, pointing out that the" wife had no marital rights to
release and all she did release were contractual rights not
shown to have a value in money or money's worth. The Sev-
enth Circuit reversed, following the reasoning of the Board
in the Bristol case, in holding that there was no gift., It
refused to follow the First Circuit in the Bristol case.
These decisions set the stage for the Supreme Court
opinions which laid this problem to rest. In William H.
Weym.ss " a putative husband, with a large estate, was anxious
to marry a woman who had an income of her own so long
as she did not remarry. An antenuptial agreement was made
under which she released her right of dower and recognized
that she was losing her other source of income, in return
for which property was transferred to her. In Merrill v.
Fahs85 a man whose worth was estimated at $5,300,000 trans-
ferred $300,000 in trust for his fiancee under an antenuptial
agreement by which she released such rights as she might
acquire as his wife or widow. In the Weymss case the Tax
Court held that the transfer was a gift, pointing out that
the wife's loss of income was not consideration flowing to
her husband. In the Merrill case the District Court refused
to follow the First Circuit in the Bristol case, and permitted
a refund on the theory that there had been no gift.
81. Id. at 136.
82. Albert D. Lasker v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 208 (1942).
83. Lasker v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 989 (7th Cir. 1943).
84. Wemyss v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 876 (1943); cf. Commissioner v.
Kelly's Estate, 84 F.2d 958 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 603
(1936), where it was said "This does not mean that the 'consideration in
money or money's worth' must have passed to the decedent in order to
make such indebtedness deductible."
85. 51 F. Supp. 120 (S.D. Fla. 1943).
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The Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court in Weymss v.
Commissioner," placing reliance on the surrender of the wife's
other source of income, but definitely favoring the result
reached by the Seventh Circuit in the Lasker case to the effect
that the surrender of marital rights constituted valuable con-
sideration. The Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court in
Fahs v. Merrill,'7 holding that the transfer amounted to a
gift and that there was no consideration in money or money's
worth.
Certiorari was granted in both cases. In Commissioner v.
Wemyss38 the holding of the Sixth Circuit was reversed and
in Merrill v. Fahs9 the holding of the Fifth Circuit was af-
firmed, with the result that the Treasury's position was up-
held and both transfers considered taxable as gifts, the
surrender of the rights acquired as wife or widow not being
considered an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth. In the Wemyss opinion the Court's review-
ing powers were then subject to the self-imposed limitations
of the rule of Dobson v. Commissioner,"0 but it did point out:
If we are to isolate as an independently reviewable ques-
tion of law the view of the Tax Court that money con-
sideration must benefit the donor to relieve the transfer
by him from being a gift, we think the Tax Court was
correct.9'1
The Court also emphasized that the Congress intended a much
broader interpretation of the word "gift" than was custom-
ary at common law.
The Court in the Merrill case, which had come up via the
District Court, was not thus circumscribed. Its opinion em-
phasized that, under Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner,92
the gift tax was supplementary to the estate tax, in pari
materia with it and that the two should be construed together.
The Court then analyzed statutory history in the two fields
and, in what has been called "statutory interpretation at its
finest,"9 concluded that recourse to the particularity of the
86. 144 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1944).
87. 142 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1942).
88. 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
89. 324 U.S. 308 (1945).
90. 320 U.S 489 (1943).
91. Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 307 (1945).
92. 308 U.S. 39 (1939).
93. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION (1946 SuPp.) 716.
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estate tax law could be had in determining what was meant
by the phrase "an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth."94
The result in both cases seems sound, if for no other reason
than that it appears consistent with Congressional intent and
is more at ease with logical interpretation. However, in the
light of present day law, it is specious to reach such a result
in reliance upon the theory that the gift tax supplemented
the estate tax or was to be construed in pa ma teria with
it. That this is hardly the case is apparent in the light of
an opinion, such as Smith v. Shaughnessy,91 in which the
Court rejected a contention by a taxpayer that a transfer,
incomplete for purposes of the estate tax should also be con-
sidered incomplete for gift tax purposes. It would seem quite
clear that any judicial attempt to import integration or cor-
relation of the estate tax into the gift tax ceased with the
Sanford case, and, as the Court admitted in the Merrill case:
"Correlation of the gift tax and the estate tax still requires
legislative intervention."9
In a Churchillian sense, the battle over antenuptial agree-
ments had ended, and the battle over post-matrimonial settle-
ments had begun. In fact, it was well underway. In other
areas the Commissioner had, on occasion, contended that vari-
ous types of family settlements were gifts. In Alice H. Lester1
the death of a father left an incompetent child in a position
of wealthy independence. Pursuant to agreement and to local
law, which imposed an obligation of support on the father's
estate, a court ordered further payments from the estate to
the child's committee. The Board held that since these were
pursuant to local law and under court decree, they were not
gifts. The Commissioner argued that, since they were en-
tirely unnecessary, they should be considered gifts. The Ninth
Circuit adopted this line and reversed the Board.98 In Clarissa
H. Thompson,99 even the Tax Court had to concur with the
Commissioner's contention that a property settlement in sat-
94. Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 311 (1945).
95. 318 U.S. 176 (1943).
96. Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 313 (1945).
97. Alice H. Lester v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 515 (1940).
98. Commissioner v. 'Greene, 119 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 641 (1941).
99. 6 T.C.M. 822 (1947).
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isfaction of a husband's marital and support rights lacked
consideration, where the wife conceded that, under applicable
local law, his curtesy rights were not items of any value.
However, the problems revolving about post-marital settle-
ment agreements under which the wife released dower and
statutory interests in the husband's estate, together with her
rights to support for a consideration flowing from the hus-
band, were being pressed. At first the Commissioner took the
position, as he had in estate tax cases, that these transfers
were gifts. In Herbert Jones,"10 the Tax Court, relying to a
certain extent upon the opinion of its predecessor, the Board,
in Bennet B. Bristol,"' although acknowledging its later re-
versal, 12 held that no gift resulted from such a transaction.
It distinguished antenuptial from postnuptial settlements
stating, in the case of the former, "the purpose to exact a
quid pro quo may be lacking.""' The Commissioner, who had
attempted to distinguish between a voluntary settlement and
one pursuant to court decree, and who had also contended
that there was no proof of the value of the wife's support
rights, nonacquiesced. "
In Clarence B. Mitchell,"'5 property was transferred to a
wife, in contemplation of divorce and in settlement of the
support obligation. The agreement was later incorporated in
a Nevada decree. The Commissioner argued for taxability
as a gift contending that Herbert Jones had ceased to be sound
law in the light of the Merrill"' and Weymss"1 cases. The
Tax Court held that the transfer was not a gift, relying upon
the Jones and Lasker"' cases and upon Edmund C. Converse,'"
subsequently reviewed by the Second Circuit in an opinion
to be discussed later, reaching the same result. There were
100. Herbert Jones v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 1207 (1943), pet. for rev.
dismissed, (7th Cir.) 5-1-44.
101. Bennett B. Bristol v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 263 (1940).
102. Commissioner v. Bristol, 121 F.2d 129 (1st Cir. 1941).
103. Herbert Jones v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 1207, 1210 (1943).
104. G.T., 1943-17 CuM. BULL. 1.
105. Clarence B. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 159 (1946), pet. for
rev. dismissed, (7th Cir.) 10-7-46.
106. 324 U.S. 308 (1945).
107. 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
108. Lasker v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 989 (7th Cir. 1943).
109. Edmund C. Converse v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1014 (1945), nonaoq.
G.T., 1946-1 CUM. BULL. 5, aff'd on other reasoning sub nom. Commis-
sioner v. Converse, 163 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1947).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
dissents in line with the Commissioner's contentions and he
noted a nonacquiescence to the decision."'
Thereafter, affairs took a somewhat incongruous turn, with
the Commissioner issuing E.T. 19,"' which provides, in part,
as follows:
Transfers of property pursuant to an agreement incident
to a divorce or legal separation are not made for an ade-
quate and full consideration in money or money's worth
to the extent that they are made in consideration of the
relinquishment or promised relinquishment of dower, cur-
tesy or of a statutory estate created in lieu of dower or
curtesy, or other marital rights in the transferror's prop-
ery or estate; to the extent that the transfers are made
in the satisfaction of support rights the transfers are held
to be for an adequate and full consideration ...
Since the Mitchell case involved support rights, the nonac-
quiescence was withdrawn and acquiescence registered.12
Thus there was imported into the gift tax picture, virtually
in hace verba, but with some minor adjustments to content,
the specification contained in the Estate Tax Section 812(b)
that a relinquishment or promised relinquishment of dower,
curtesy, or their statutory equivalents is not an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth. It is to be
noted, too, that the phrase "or other marital rights in the
transferror's property" appears in the same ruling, but that
support rights are specifically excepted. What those other
rights are, if not support, is certainly a matter of conjecture,
but it lends some credence to Judge Hand's dissent in Meyer's
Estate v. Commissioner.13  It also raises a question as to what
has become of the Commissioner's position, if such there was,
that the phrase "other marital rights" included support, a
stand adopted in the Meyer's opinion and intimated in Mark-
well's Estate v. Commissioner.4
The Tax Court, like an unreconstructed rebel, continued in
the course which it had set for itself in the Jones case. In
Matthew Lahti,"5 Albert C. Moore,"' Norman Tautrog,"7 and
110. G.T., 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 5.
111. 1946-2 CuM. BULL. 166.
112. 1946-2 Cum. BuLL. 4.
113. 110 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 651 (1940).
114. 112 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1940).
115. Matthew Lahti v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 7 (1946), nonacq. G.T.,
1946-2 Cum. BULL. 6.
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Edward B. McLean,"8 it had before it cases in which a pre-
divorce agreement was entered into which was later incor-
porated into a decree. Under the agreement the wife, in con-
sideration of the husband making financial provisions for her,
surrendered her rights of support and of sharing in his prop-
erty. In each case the Tax Court held that no gift had been
made, theorizing on the basis of the Converse and Jones de-
cisions of the same tribunal. In each case the Commissioner
registered nonacquiescence. In each case the disregard of
E.T. 19 was quite evident.
In William Barclay Harding,"' a separation agreement pro-
vided for the immediate cash payment to a wife of $350,000,
in addition to periodic payments until she should die or re-
marry. By agreement, she released all support rights for
herself and her children, dower rights and all other marital
rights in her husband's property. At the time the agreement
was made, divorce was contemplated and the agreement was
to be binding whether or not there was a divorce. A Nevada
divorce was obtained two years after the agreement, which
ordered compliance with the agreement. The Court held that
the transfer was not a gift, citing most of the aforementioned
cases. There was the same dissent as in the previous cases,
based on the Merrill and Weymss decisions. Yet the Com-
missioner acquiesced. 1" One can only conjecture that the
presence of support provisions or the palpability of the decree
resulted in this action.
The views of the Tax Court on this question are puzzling, 1'
but the decisions reached by the Courts of Appeal which have
considered the question are, perhaps, even more so. In Ed-
mund C. Converse,12' which has been alluded to previously, a
husband and wife executed a separation agreement in 1941 by
the terms of which the husband provided for a minor child
116. Albert C. Moore v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 393 (1948), nonacq. G.T.,
1948-1 CUM. BULL. 4.
117. Norman Taurog v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 1016 (1948), nonacq.
1949 INT. REV. BULL. No. 8 at 13,060.
118. Edward B. McLean v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 543 (1948), nonacq.
G.T., 1949-1 CuM. BULL. 6.
119. W. B. Harding v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 1051 (1948).
120. G.T., 1949-1 CUM. BULL. 2.
121. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (1946 SuPP.) 716.
122. Edmund C. Converse v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1014 (1945), nonacq.
G.T., 1946-1 CuM. BULL. 5, aff'd., on other reasoning sub nom. Commis-
sioner v. Converse, 163 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1947).
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and promised to pay the wife $1200 a month for her release
of marital rights. She then sued in Nevada for a divorce
and he contested on the ground that the property settlement
was unfair. The Nevada Court decreed that the wife receive
$625,000 in cash in lieu of monthly payments and in full dis-
charge of all her rights. The Tax Court held it was not a
gift, making a distinction between antenuptial and postnuptial
agreements. The Second Circuit affirmed, but rejected this
distinction, pointing out that the real delineation was between
a voluntary settlement and one founded upon a money judg-
ment which would have been a claim against the husband's
estate under cases such as Commissioner v. State Street Trust
Co.,12 and Commissioner v. Maresi.12
In Roland M. Hooker"' a husband and wife, having two
children, made a separation agreement, transferring to the
wife securities worth about $50,000, of which no mention was
made in the agreement and $15,000 in cash which was stated to
be in full settlement of the obligations to the wife. The husband
also executed two trusts, one for each child, to which he prom-
ised to transfer one-sixth of what he received from the estate
of his mother. A Nevada decree incorporated the agreement.
On the death of his mother, the husband was forced to make
a transfer to the trusts for the children. The Tax Court held
the transfers gifts to the extent that they exceeded the obliga-
tion to support, expressly disavowing the holding of the Sec-
ond Circuit in the Converse case, as far as it held that
a decree prevented a transfer from being a gift, if it other-
wise were such. It added "but the absence of a donative intent
and the presence of an adequate consideration in money or
money's worth may not be presumed in prenuptial agree-
ments and transfers for the benefit of minor children."'' I The
Fifth Circuit affirmed in accordance with the general tenor of
E.T. 19.127
123. Estate of Francis Browne Grinnell v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 1286(1941), aff'd sub nom. Commissioner v. State Street Trust Co., 128 F.2d
618 (1st Cir. 1942).
124. 156 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1946); but see, Edythe C. Young v. Com-
missioner, 39 B.T.A. 230 (1939); Fleming v. Yoke, 53 F. Supp. 552 (N.D.
W. Va. 1944); Commissioner v. Estate of Swink, 155 F.2d 723 (4th Cir.
1946) ; Revenue Act of 1924 § 303 (a) (1), 43 STAT. 305 (1924).
125. Roland M. Hooker v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 388 (1948).
126. Id. at 392.
127. Hooker v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1949).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss2/1
MARITAL SETTLEMENTS AND FEDERAL TAXATION 197
In Estate of Josephine C. Barnard,"8 a wife paid her hus-
band $50,000 to release his marital claims under a separation
agreement and agreed to set up a trust of $50,000 more when
she got a divorce. The divorce ratified the agreement, but
did not mention the second $50,000. The wife made the pay-
ment. The Tax Court, following its usual line, held that the
first transfer was supported by consideration and that the
second was a gift. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that
the first transfer was also a gift.'" The distinction between
a prenuptial and post-marital settlement, as to the presence
of a business purpose, was said to be "fanciful." The Court
added:
This distinction without a difference seems to have devel-
oped in the Tax Court which early become committed to
a different view-see Jones v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 1207
-and then felt unwilling to accept what we think is the
clear import of the Supreme Court's analysis. Accord-
ingly in a series of decisions of which the present is one,
the Tax Court has applied this distinction. But this view
has not been without dissent; thus we regard the vigor-
ous dissents of Judge Disney ... as stating the necessary
and correct principles after Merrill v. Fahs, supra.1"'
The Court felt that the Converse case had been "cited beyond
its scope" because the decree itself created a debt, and that
the Maresil" case did not pass upon the point at issue.
In Cornelia Harris,12 a wife paid money in a property set-
tlement adopted in a divorce decree. Following the reason-
ing of the Barnard case in the Tax Court, the payment was
held not to be a gift. The Second Circuit reversed, holding
that the mere approval of an agreement by a court does not
prevent it from being a gift."3' The Maresi case was again
distinguished with the language:
The decision stands for no more than that, when the valid-
ity of the settlement is made conditional on its adoption
by the decree, and when it does not by its terms survive
the decree, the payments are not "founded" upon the
"promise or agreement." 14
128. Estate of J. C. Barnard v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 61 (1947).
129. Commissioner v. Barnard's Estate, 176 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1949).
130. Id. at 235-236.
131 Commissioner v. Maresi, 156 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1946).
132. Cornelia Harris v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 741 (1948).
133. Cornelia Harris v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1950).
134. Id. at 864; see also Krause v. Yoke, 89 F.Supp. 91 (N.D. W.Va. 1950).
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Probably there is little doubt that the Tax Court was grasp-
ing at straws in seeking to fly in the face of the Merrill and
Wemyss decision. In the light of the estate tax interpreta-
tion it is to be doubted that its distinction between antenuptial
and postnuptial agreements was valid.135 However, to cling
to the delineation between an agreement "adopted" by a
decree and one of independent insertion by a court seems
equally untenable because of the ease with which consent ar-
rangements can be made. At any rate, there is some hope that
this problem may be clarified in the near future for the Supreme
Court granted a petition for a writ of Certiorari in the Harris
case on March 27, 1950, consenting to review these issues.
Nonetheless, the insistence of the Commissioner on his
position that by "giving all to love" no consideration is in-
volved could lead to ridiculous extremes. The betrothal cere-
mony, even in this enlightened era, entails considerable giv-
ing-the meritricious relationship of philanderer and mistress
perhaps even more so."" Were the Commissioner to press for
a gift tax in cases of this nature, he would be donning the
stole of the father confessor. It seems dubious that tax col-
lection would be carried this far.
THE INCOME TAX
The problem in this field arises in ascertaining the basis
upon which property received under an antenuptial or post-
marital agreement is deemed to have been taken. If it is
considered a gift-which seems to be true under the gift and
estate tax laws-basis is usually the cost to the last person
who acquired it by other than gift unless a lesser loss will
result from taking it at its transfer value."' On the other
hand, if consideration was given, the basis is value at the time
of transfer and the gain is ascertained on that ground."'
The cases in the income tax field seem a world apart from
concepts heretofore considered. In L. W. Mesta"' a husband
transferred securities to his wife under a post-marital prop-
erty settlement. The Commissioner treated the transaction
135. Note, Are Transfers of Property Pursuant to Separation Agree-
ments Gifts? 5 TAx L. REv. 90 (1949).
136. Rudick, Marriage, Divorce and Taxes, 2 TAX L. REV. 123 (1947).
137. INT. REV. CODE, § 113 (a) (2).
138. INT. REV. CODE, § 113 (a).
139. L. W. Mesta v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 933 (1940).
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as a sale of the securities for marital rights. The Board
held that such rights had no value and, while the transaction
was not a gift in the eyes of the income tax law, no gain was
realizable. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that a sale
had been made and a capital gain realized.4 0 A similar re-
sult by the Board'4' and a reversal on similar grounds by the
Second Circuit followed one year later.42
In a relatively recent case a taxpayer who had received
securities under an antenuptial settlement sold them after di-
vorce. They had greatly increased in value between the time
when the husband originally acquired them and when he
transferred them to her. She sought to use the latter as her
basis. The Tax Court held the transfer a gift, under the
theory of the Merrill and Weymss cases, calling for the use
of the cost to her spouse.4 3 The Second Circuit held that
value at the time of transfer governed'" and said:
In our opinion the income tax provisions are not to be
construed as though they were in pacri materkt with either
the estate tax law or the gift tax statutes.'4
So too, where a wife forced a cash settlement of her dower rights
before consenting to a sale of her husband's land, the amount
paid to her was not treated as part of the purchase price flowing
to her husband. 14 6 Decisions may come and go but it would seem
that incongruities go on forever.
CONCLUSION
Some of the principles hereinbefore described seem quite
clearly out of line. Satisfaction of obligations arising out of
the family relationship are surely based upon consideration, 47
to which reason and common sense must testify. Marriage
is a compelling inducement for many things and it seems
almost juvenile to claim that the obligations growing out of
140. Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
316 U.S. 695 (1941).
141. Walter S. Halliwell v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 740 (1941).
142. Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. de-
nied, 319 U.S. 741 (1942).
143. Farid-es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 652 (1946).
144. Farid-es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947).
145. Id. at 814.
146. Yost v. O'Malley, 88 F.Supp. 626 (D.C. Neb. 1950).
147. Seaman v. United States, 156 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1946).
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the matrimonial relationship are valueless,' even for tax law
purposes. The obligation to support one's wife is a real one,
which most errant husbands must admit.'49 It seems un-
realistic to treat it otherwise.
In such an uncharted sea, care must be taken to avoid the
rocks and shoals of specious reasoning. The facts of each
case should be examined, by tax collector even as by tax
counsel. Artificial logic should be averted by both. Once
the realties of the situation are agreed upon, the course should
be set and adhered to. Both the government and the tax-
payer would thus be adequately forewarned and forearmed.
Until that happy day when non-Emersonian consistency is a
touchstone of tax law, however, it would seem to be the bet-
ter part of wisdom for tax counsel to draw marital agree-
ments with an eye toward a tax collector who, with few
exceptions, tends to consider all transfers made under them
as gifts.5 '
148. Catherine S. Beveridge v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 915 (1948).
149. Douglas v. Wilcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935); Helvering v. Fuller, 310
U.S. 69 (1940).
150. See Seidman, DivoRcE AND GIFT TAXES, 28 TAXES 105 (1950).
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